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Abstract. In a market entry game, the number of entrants usually approaches game-theoretic equilibrium quickly, but in real-world
markets business start-ups typically exceed market capacity, resulting in chronically high failure rates and suboptimal industry profits.
Excessive entry has been attributed to overconfidence arising when expected payoffs depend partly on skill. In an experimental test of
this hypothesis, 96 participants played 24 rounds of a market entry game, with expected payoffs dependent partly on skill on half the
rounds, after their confidence was manipulated and measured. The results provide direct support for the hypothesis that high levels of
confidence are largely responsible for excessive entry, and they suggest that absolute confidence, independent of interpersonal compar-
ison, rather than confidence about one’s abilities relative to others, drives excessive entry decisions when skill is involved.
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How do entrepreneurs decide whether or not to risk starting
up new businesses in a competitive market? In a typical
competitive market, more entrants mean less profit for
each, and if the number of entrants exceeds the market ca-
pacity, then some are bound to suffer net losses and to be
forced out of the market.
A market entry game (MEG) is a type of experimental
game designed to model market entry decisions. In the
standard experimental paradigm, introduced by Kahneman
(1988), members of a group make repeated individual de-
cisions to enter or to stay out of an idealized competitive
market. Players choose simultaneously and anonymously,
without communicating with one another, and the only in-
formation fed back to them is the number of entrants on
each round. The game’s payoff structure reflects funda-
mental strategic properties of real-world competitive mar-
kets payoffs that diminish as the number of entrants in-
creases, net losses for some entrants whenever market ca-
pacity is exceeded, and no profits or losses for players who
stay out of the market.
In experimental MEGs, the number of entrants converg-
es close to Nash equilibrium after a few rounds (Rapoport,
1995; Rapoport, Seale, Erev, & Sundali, 1998; Sundali,
Rapoport, & Seale, 1995). In Nash equilibrium, by defini-
tion, the number of market entrants is such that none could
have done better for themselves by staying out and none
who stayed out could have done better by entering. When
these conditions are met in a MEG, the aggregate payoff to
the players, corresponding to the aggregate industry profit,
is maximized. The experimental findings suggest that play-
ers somehow learn to behave rationally in this sense, max-
imizing their own expected payoffs given the behavior of
other players, without communicating with one another.
Kahneman (1988) famously commented that, “to a psy-
chologist, it looks like magic” (p. 12). In game-theoretic
terms, players choose on each round between entering and
staying out by comparing the expected payoffs from these
two strategies and choosing the one that yields the greater
expected payoff. In order to make such judgments, they
have to forecast the number of entrants, and the evidence
suggests that their forecasts are remarkably accurate.
In stark contrast to these laboratory findings, studies of
real-world market entry decisions indicate that entrepre-
neurs do not generally decide rationally. The number of
start-ups typically exceeds market capacity by a large mar-
gin, resulting in most new businesses failing within a few
years (Dunne, Roberts, & Samuelson, 1988; Mata & Por-
tugal, 1994; Wagner, 1994). How can this embarrassing in-
consistency between laboratory and real-world market en-
try behavior be explained?
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) suggested that excessive
entry in real-world markets may be explained by the fact
that payoffs are contingent partly on skill – a feature lack-
ing in the standard MEG. They reported an experiment us-
ing a modified MEG in which, on some rounds, entrants’
chances of winning depended partly on skill, as measured
by their scores on a general-knowledge quiz, and on other
rounds were determined randomly, as in the standard MEG.
Their analysis of amounts of money won and lost suggests
that excessive entry occurred mainly on skill-based rounds.
They explained this in terms of reference group neglect:
participants, who self-selected for the experiment on the
understanding that payoffs would be related to perfor-
mance on a general-knowledge quiz, may have overesti-
mated their chances of performing well, neglecting the fact
that the other players had also self-selected and were also
likely to believe themselves better than average at general-
knowledge quizzes.
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This suggests that excessive market entry on skill-based
rounds of a MEG, and possibly also in real-world markets,
may be fuelled by entrants’ overconfidence about their own
skill levels. In the literature on subjective probability judg-
ment, a distinction may be drawn between two extensively
researched phenomena, namely the overconfidence effect
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982), a tendency to
overestimate the probability that one’s own judgments or
knowledge are correct, and unrealistic optimism (Wein-
stein, 1980), a tendency to believe oneself more likely than
others to experience good fortune. In this article, we wish
instead to make a new distinction between overestimation
of one’s abilities relative to others, which we label relative
overconfidence, and overestimation of one’s abilities inde-
pendently of interpersonal comparison, which we label ab-
solute overconfidence. One of the goals of the experiment
described below is to establish the separate contributions
of these two types of overconfidence to market entry be-
havior. This distinction also has potential relevance to de-
cision making in a broad range of other domains, including
medical and consumer decisions.
The primary goal, however, is to test Camerer and Lo-
vallo’s (1999) hypothesis that overconfidence is responsi-
ble for excessive entry on skill-based rounds of a MEG and,
by implication, in real-world competitive markets also. Be-
cause Camerer and Lovallo did not test this hypothesis di-
rectly by manipulating or measuring confidence, we ma-
nipulated confidence as an independent variable and mea-
sured both relative and absolute confidence as dependent
variables. It is intuitive to suppose that absolute confidence
will be elevated after answering a set of easy questions and
lowered after answering a set of hard questions – there is
some evidence supporting this intuition (e.g., Gigerenzer,
Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Stankov, 2000). Similarly,
with regard to relative confidence, research on the worse-
than-average effect has shown that people commonly
judge their performance to be better than average on easy
tasks but worse than average on hard ones (Hoelzl & Rus-
tichini, 2005; Moore & Kim, 2003; Windschitl, Kruger, &
Simms, 2003). For these reasons we decided to use task
difficulty as a means of manipulating confidence. Further,
we used a lifelike MEG with a payoff function that was
simpler and easier to understand than those used in previ-
ous MEG experiments, while retaining the essential strate-
gic properties of the game, and our experimental design
included two market capacities.
Method
Participants
The participants were 96 undergraduates (48 men and 48
women) recruited through an online participant panel at the
University of Leicester. Their average age was 23.60 years
(range 18–73).
Design and Materials
Participants were assigned to 16-player groups before play-
ing 24 rounds of a MEG. To increase the comprehension,
motivation, and psychological involvement of the players,
we presented the MEG as a simulation of 24 opportunities
to open restaurants in small or large (fictitious) towns, de-
pending on market capacity (eight or four). As detailed be-
low, we manipulated three within-subjects independent
variables (reward basis, market capacity, and order), and
one between-subjects variable designed to influence confi-
dence (perceived quiz difficulty).
Reward Basis
Members of each group were ranked on the basis of a quiz
administered after the MEG. Whenever market capacity
was exceeded, payoffs were calculated by dividing the en-
trants into winners and losers either randomly (on 12 ran-
dom rounds) or according to their quiz rankings (on 12
skill-based rounds). The quiz consisted of 20 two-alterna-
tive, forced-choice (2AFC) questions, each requiring a
judgment as to which of two UK listed companies produced
more profit in the previous year. The quiz was designed to
have higher face validity as a measure of entrepreneurial
skill, and hence more potential for manipulating confi-
dence in the MEG, than the general-knowledge trivia quiz-
zes used in previous research in this area.
Market Capacity and Payoffs
We varied market capacity at two levels, c = 8 and c = 4,
corresponding to one-half and one-quarter of the group size
respectively. All players participated in 12 rounds with
each market capacity. On every round with c or fewer mar-
ket entrants, the entrants shared a payoff of £15 (about $30)
equally. On every round on which market capacity was ex-
ceeded, the entrants were ranked either randomly (on ran-
dom rounds) or according to their quiz rankings (on skill-
based rounds), then the top c entrants shared £15 equally,
and each of the entrants outside the top c ranks lost £5. With
c = 8, Nash equilibrium occurs when 10 or 11 players enter,
and with c = 4, when six or seven enter. As an example, if
market capacity is eight and 10 players enter, then an en-
trant has a 8/10 probability of receiving a 1/8 share of the
£15 payoff, because there are always eight winners, and a
2/10 probability of losing £5, hence the expected payoff is
(8/10)(£15/8) + (2/10)(–£5) = £0.50. This means that an
entrant could not have done better by staying out, nor could
a player who stayed out have done better by entering, be-
cause the number of entrants would then be 11 and an en-
trant’s expected payoff would be (8/11)(£15/8) + (3/11)
(–£5) = £0.00; but with fewer than 10 entrants, a player
who stayed out could have received a positive payoff by
entering, and with more than 11 entrants, a player who en-
114 F. Bolger et al.: Market Entry Decisions
Experimental Psychology 2008; Vol. 55(2):113–120 © 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
tered could have avoided expected loss by staying out. A
formal specification of the payoff function and full equilib-
rium analysis is provided in the Appendix.
Order
For simplicity and transparency, and to help the players to
focus on the relevant reward basis and market capacity
while making their decisions, we blocked rounds with the
same reward basis and market capacity rather than random-
izing these variables. Thus, some participants played six
random rounds with market capacity c = 8 first, then six
random rounds with c = 4, and so on, enabling possible
order effects to be checked statistically.
Perceived Quiz Difficulty
This was the between-subjects independent variable in-
tended to manipulate participants’ confidence before they
played the MEG. We showed participants five examples of
the type of questions they could expect in the main quiz
that would determine their rankings and therefore their
chances of winning whenever they entered the market. We
assigned each 16-player group randomly to a treatment
condition in which these example questions were either
hard or easy. The hard or easy example questions were
those that had elicited the lowest or highest confidence rat-
ings respectively from 18 participants in a pilot study of 60
candidate questions that we carried out before the experi-
ment. The main quiz – the same for all participants – con-
sisted of 20 questions of moderate difficulty.
Procedure
Each group of 16 players sat in rows facing the experiment-
ers. They first read a set of general instructions that the
experimenters also summarized orally. They then answered
the five hard or easy example questions and, to provide
measures of confidence, they made the following pair of
forecasts, designed to measure absolute and relative confi-
dence respectively:
– How many of the 20 very similar questions in the real
quiz do you expect to get right?
– Out of the group who will be taking the quiz this session,
how do you think you will be ranked (first, second, third,
etc., where first means you get the most right in the
group)?
Players were told that they would be paid at the end of the
session the average of the money that they earned across
all 24 rounds of the MEG. They were shown a payoff
scheme specifying the gains and losses for different num-
bers of market entrants. As an illustration, the payoff
scheme for c = 8 is shown in Table 1.
The experimenters announced the market capacity be-
fore each block of six rounds and reminded the group of
the payoff basis (skill or random) before every round. The
players were given specific written instructions for each
round, a typical example being: “There are 16 people think-
ing of setting up a business in Wincanton, which being a
larger town can support eight restaurants. Only the best
eight restaurants will make a profit, and all others that set
up will lose money.”
On each round, players indicated on their answer sheets
their decisions to enter or to stay out and their forecasts of
how many in the group (including themselves) would enter.
To enable the experimenters to count and announce the
number of entrants on each round, players also raised ba-
tons displaying the word Yes or No. Because they sat in
rows facing the experimenters, they could not see the faces
of one another’s batons. After 24 rounds, players answered
the quiz questions. Rankings and payments were then com-
puted, and participants were paid off and debriefed.
Results
Equilibrium Behavior
Table 2 shows the mean numbers of entrants per round
(range 0 to 16) as a function of market capacity (c = 8 and
c = 4), reward basis (skill or random), and perceived quiz
difficulty (hard or easy example questions). Entry frequen-
cies averaged across rounds of the same reward basis and
market capacity are depicted in Figure 1.
For market capacity eight, numbers of entrants per round
were at or marginally below Nash equilibrium (10 or 11)
for three of the four treatment combinations (Ms = 10.28
and 9.94 on random rounds with hard and easy example
questions and 9.67 on skill-based rounds with hard exam-
ples) and slightly above equilibrium (M = 11.11) for one
Table 1. Payoff scheme shown to players in treatment conditions with market capacity one-half (c = 8)
Rankings on the next six rounds are random; market capacity = 1/2 (8 restaurants). If you stay out you will win/lose nothing. If you enter
on a round and are ranked in the top 8 then your payoff this round will be as follows:
Number entering (including yourself) 1 enters 2 enter 3 enter 4 enter 5 enter 6 enter 7 enter 8 enter
Amount you win £15.00 £7.50 £5.00 £3.75 £3.00 £2.50 £2.14 £1.87
In other words, up to the market capacity, all entrants will share the £15 winnings equally. If there are more entrants than the market capacity
(i.e., 9 or more) then only the top 8 ranked entrants will win money – they will share the £15 between them (so will get £1.87 each) – all other
entrants who enter will lose £5 each.
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treatment combination, namely skill-based rounds with
easy questions. We conducted a split-plot ANOVA on entry
frequency for each of the six groups, averaged across
rounds of the same reward basis, for market capacity eight
only – this had one within-subjects factor, reward basis,
with two levels, and one between-subjects factor, perceived
quiz difficulty, also with two levels. Main effects are non-
significant, and the interaction Perceived Quiz Difficulty ×
Reward Basis is marginally significant: F(1, 4) = 4.66. p =
.097, partial η2 = .54.
For market capacity four (Nash equilibrium six or sev-
en), the number of entrants was close to equilibrium only
on random rounds with easy examples (M = 7.06). Entry
was excessive on random rounds with hard examples (M =
7.83), skill-based rounds with hard examples (M = 8.17),
and especially skill-based rounds with easy examples (M =
8.94). We performed another split-plot ANOVA, identical
to the previous one but for entry when market capacity was
four. The effect of reward basis is large and significant,
F(1, 4) = 29.09, p = .006, partial η2 = .88, and so is the
interaction Perceived Quiz Difficulty × Reward Basis:
F(1, 4) = 14.26. p = .020, partial η2 = .78. Both of these
effect sizes are large (Cohen, 1988).
The most striking feature of Figure 1 is the comparative-
ly greater entry frequency on skill-based than random
rounds with easy examples than other treatment combina-
Table 2. Mean number of market entrants per round for market capacities 8 versus 4, hard versus easy example questions,
on skill-based and random reward rounds
Reward basis & capacity
Rounds
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Random, Capacity 8
Hard 11.33 10.00 10.33 10.00 9.00 11.00 10.28
Easy 9.33 10.67 9.33 9.33 10.67 10.33 9.94
Total 10.33 10.33 9.83 9.67 9.83 10.67 10.11
Random, Capacity 4
Hard 8.33 8.00 7.67 8.33 8.33 6.33 7.83
Easy 7.33 7.00 6.67 6.00 7.33 8.00 7.06
Total 7.83 7.50 7.17 7.17 7.83 7.17 7.44
Skill, Capacity 8
Hard 8.00 9.00 10.33 9.00 10.33 11.33 9.67
Easy 11.33 13.33 10.33 9.67 11.00 11.00 11.11
Total 9.67 11.17 10.33 9.33 10.67 11.17 10.39
Skill, Capacity 4
Hard 9.00 8.00 10.00 8.33 6.33 7.33 8.17
Easy 7.67 7.67 11.00 11.00 9.00 7.33 8.94





























Figure 1. Mean numbers of entrants
per round as a function of reward basis
(random or skill) and perceived quiz
difficulty (hard or easy example ques-
tions) for market capacities c = 8 and
c = 4.
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tions. For both market capacities, more players entered on
skill-based rounds with easy example questions than in any
other treatment combination. It is also clear that excessive
entry, relative to market capacity, was more frequent when
market capacity was small. Mean excess entries – entries
in excess of market capacity, expressed as percentages –
were 99.31% when c = 4 compared with 27.95% when c =
8: F(1, 4) = 296.80, p < .001, partial η2 = .99 (large).
Order
Order of rounds with different reward bases and market
capacities had no significant effects on market entry or con-
fidence ratings, nor did it contribute to any significant in-
teractions with other variables, and we therefore omitted it
from subsequent analyses.
Confidence
Mean forecasts of performance on the main quiz, converted
to percentages, were 51.90% (SD = 15.87%) for partici-
pants given hard examples and 67.40% (SD = 14.77%) for
those given easy examples, showing significantly greater
absolute confidence in the latter group, t(94) = 4.96, p <
.001, with a large effect size (Cohen, 1988) of d = 0.90.
Forecasted quiz rankings were also higher in the easy-ex-
ample group (M = 6.65, SD = 3.06) than the hard-example
group (M = 8.77, SD = 3.74), showing significantly higher
relative confidence in the easy-examples group, t(94) =
3.05, p < .01, effect size d = 0.60 (medium).
Effects of Confidence on Market Entry
We used Camerer and Lovallo’s (1999) technique of mea-
suring the difference between entry on skill-based rounds
and random rounds, to provide a within-subjects control for
risk preferences and other individual differences that are
uncontrolled when skill and random rounds are analyzed
separately. This difference score, ranging from –12 to +12,
was then entered into a multiple regression as the criterion
variable in order to examine the contributions of absolute
and relative confidence to market entry. The range of pos-
sible responses differed between the two predictors (0–20
for absolute confidence and 1–16 for relative confidence).
The standard deviations of the two measures are almost
identical (3.43 for absolute confidence and 3.56 for relative
confidence), however, to eliminate all possibility of the
range difference causing spurious effects, we standardized
the variables prior to the regression analysis. The results of
the regression are shown in Table 3. As can be seen, a sig-
nificant model was produced, R2 = .074 (adjusted R2 =
.054), and the only significant predictor variable was abso-
lute confidence: β = .269, t(94) = 2.06, p = .042. Thus,
higher confidence in one’s future performance predicted
greater entry frequency when skill was involved compared
with when no skill was involved, in line with our expecta-
tions, and it was only absolute confidence that was signif-
icantly predictive of entry frequency.
Separate analysis of skill-based and random rounds
yielded similar results. On skill-based rounds, a regression
analysis produced an R2 value of .115 (adjusted R2 = .105).
The only significant coefficient was the forecasted number,
measured before the main quiz, of questions correct on the
quiz: β = .339, t(94) = 3.47, p = .001. On random rounds,
regression did not produce a significant model. Thus, ab-
solute confidence predicted entry frequency on skill-based
but not random rounds, in line with our expectations.
Forecasts and Entry Decisions
Players’ entry decisions correlated negatively with their
forecasts of the numbers of entrants in the majority (21 out
of 24) of rounds, 14 of these correlations attaining signifi-
cance at p < .05, and none of the three positive correlations
approached significance. In line with straightforward stra-
tegic thinking, players entered more frequently when they
forecasted fewer other entrants. Mean forecast errors were
less than a half an entrant either way except for in the ex-
perimental condition with easy examples, a market capac-
ity of four, and a skill-based reward – here the participants
underestimated the number of entrants by 1.40 on average,
and this was significantly different from zero (see Table 4).
Table 3. Regression model predicting differences in entry
between rounds with skill or random reward bases
Independent variable B t p
Absolute confidence .269 2.06 .042
Relative confidence –.003 –.03 .980
R2 .074 .028
Table 4. Mean error in forecasting number of entrants by experimental condition (SD in parentheses)
Reward basis Random Skill
Capacity 8 4 8 4
Hard quiz –.15 (1.50) –.38 (1.59) +.48 (1.37)* –.37 (1.45)
Easy quiz +.01 (1.22) +.16 (1.17) –.42 (1.20)* –1.40 (1.10)**
Total –.07 (1.36) –.11 (1.42) +.03 (1.36) –.88 (1.38)**
Note. A positive sign indicates overestimation and a negative underestimation. ** p < .001. * p < .05.
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Discussion
Why does excessive market entry typically occur in real-
world markets, causing a majority of new companies to fail
within a few years? And why, in light of this excessive
entry in real-world markets, does entry behavior in MEGs
tend to converge close to Nash equilibrium after a few
rounds? Our results support Camerer and Lovallo’s (1999)
hypothesis that overconfidence causes excessive market
entry when success depends partly on skill. In line with
previous research on market entry games, we found entry
levels close to Nash equilibrium on rounds in which skill
played no part in determining which entrants would be win-
ners, and excessive entry chiefly on skill-based rounds
when players’ confidence had been boosted with easy ex-
amples of quiz questions that would be used to measure
their skill. These findings provide direct corroboration of
Camerer and Lovallo’s hypothesis, because we manipulat-
ed and measured confidence – our manipulation shifted
confidence significantly in the expected direction, increas-
ing confidence of the participants given easy example ques-
tions relative to those given hard examples – and because
market entry decisions turned out to be generally more fre-
quent when confidence was high. Moore and Cain (2007)
have reported a similar effect. In their study, a difficult task
tended to result in under-entry in skill-based rounds relative
to random rounds of a MEG, whereas an easy task gener-
ally led to over-entry.
By distinguishing carefully between absolute and rela-
tive confidence, our results clarify the nature of the over-
confidence effect on market entry behavior. We measured
both absolute confidence (estimation of one’s abilities in-
dependently of interpersonal comparison) and relative con-
fidence (estimation of one’s abilities relative to others). Our
measures of absolute and relative confidence were quite
strongly correlated (r = .65), each accounting for about 40
per cent of the variance in the other, but only absolute con-
fidence (and not relative confidence) was significantly pre-
dictive of more frequent entry on skill-based than random
rounds of the MEG. We conclude from this that it is high
levels of absolute confidence that drives excessive market
entry. This implies that excessive entry on skill-based
rounds, and perhaps also excessive entry in real-world mar-
kets, does not arise from simple ignorance of the competi-
tion or the competitive environment but from intrinsic con-
fidence that is likely to be impervious to information about
competitors.
The finding that excessive entry occurred significantly
more frequently in markets with small than large market
capacities tends to confirm this neglect of information
about competitors. With group size constant, as it was
throughout the experiment, market entry was more likely
to result in loss when market capacity was small, because
in those circumstances it required only a small number of
other players to decide to enter for market capacity to be
exceeded. The significantly greater frequency of excessive
entry when there was a small market capacity suggests that
players with high absolute confidence did not discount suf-
ficiently for the small capacity when judging their chances
of success. This phenomenon has potential significance for
decision making in other situations in which confidence
influences risk taking, including a broad range of econom-
ic, political, and personal decisions.
Moore and Cain (2007) found a stronger influence of rel-
ative confidence than absolute confidence on market entry, in
contrast to our findings. There are several differences be-
tween the two experiments, in terms of method, measures and
analysis, that could account for this discrepancy. First, Moore
and Cain administered a mini-quiz between each MEG round
and presented feedback about the performance of each group
member on a blackboard before the subsequent MEG round,
and this is likely to have focused participants’ attention on
their performance relative to others in the group. Second,
Moore and Cain used groups of seven players, whereas our
groups were more than twice the size, and smaller group size
facilitates relative comparisons. Third, we did not measure
relative and absolute confidence in the same way as Moore
and Cain. Fourth and most important, Moore and Cain used
individual entry decisions as the units of analysis in their
regression analyses, whereas we used decision makers as the
units of analysis. Moore and Cain’s data therefore pertain to
decisions, whereas ours pertain to decision makers. We be-
lieve that our measures and analyses reflect real-world mar-
ket entry more closely, because entrepreneurs do not usually
receive immediate, precise, and reliable feedback about their
performance relative to competitors, and because larger
group sizes are more representative of most real-world mar-
kets, but further research is needed to determine the precise
conditions under which market entry is driven by relative or
absolute confidence (or both).
It is worth commenting finally on important differences
between entry behavior in experimental and real-world
markets. In MEG experiments, unlike most real-world mar-
kets, the number of potential entrants is held constant. This
naturally limits the role of competitive blind spots proposed
by Zajac and Bazerman (1991). Many disastrous real-
world entry decisions occur because firms fail to anticipate
potential entrants. The discrepancy between behavior ob-
served in the real world and standard laboratory MEGs can
also be explained by a judgmental bias that causes some
people in real-world situations to be egocentrically over-
confident about their own abilities. This has obvious prac-
tical implications for entrepreneurs and managers, who
need to consider the potential strengths and weaknesses of
their businesses relative to those of their competitors before
deciding to enter a market. Our findings suggest that they
should be especially wary when markets have small capac-
ity or seem to present easy business opportunities, or both,
because over-entry seems most likely in such circumstanc-
es. Our findings are also theoretically important because of
their evident relevance to the debate about human rational-
ity, a debate that is particularly intense in relation to the
psychology of economic behavior.
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Appendix
Payoff Function and Equilibrium Analysis
Groups of exactly 16 participants played 24 rounds of a
market entry game. Players knew the market capacity c on
each round (c = 8 or c = 4) and were ranked from r = 1 to
16 but did not know their rankings. Each player decided on
each round whether to enter the market, with a chance of
earning a share of the fixed industry profit V and an asso-
ciated risk of suffering a fixed loss f, or to stay out of the
market.
To clarify the payoff function, three cases need to be
considered. First, a decision to stay out on a particular
round yields a payoff of zero. Second, whenever the num-
ber of entrants k on a particular round is strictly less than
c, a constant industry profit V is split equally among the k
entrants, and the payoff to each of the 16 – k nonentrants
is zero. Third, whenever k is equal to or greater than c,
entrants’ payoffs are determined by players’ rankings. In
this case, every entrant ranked r ≤ c receives an equal share
of the industry profit V, every entrant ranked r > c receives
a payoff of –f (suffers a loss of f), and every nonentrant
receives a payoff of zero. In this model, V and f are con-
stants.
Formally, we denote Player i’s strategy by si (0 = stay
out, 1 = enter) and the (expected) payoff Pi resulting from









0, if si = 0
V
k








, if si = 1 and k ≥ c
If the vector of strategies of all players other than i are
written s–i, then the strategy profile s = (si, s–i) comprising
one strategy chosen by each player is in Nash equilibrium
by definition if every player’s strategy is a best reply to the
other players’ strategies. Formally, s = (si, s–i) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if
Pi(si, s−i) ≥ Pi(si′, s−i) ∀ si′, ∀i.
It is clear that every strategy profile with k < c is out of
equilibrium, because a player who stays out and receives a
payoff of zero could have entered and received a payoff of
V/k > 0, hence the strategy of staying out is not a best reply
to the other players’ strategies. Nash equilibrium occurs
when k ≥ c and the following two conditions are satisfied:
Pi(1, s–i) ≥ 0, so that an entrant could not have done better
by staying out; and for k + 1, Pi(1, s–i) ≤ 0, so that a player
who stayed out could have done better by entering. For the

















For the second condition, replacing k with k + 1 and revers-
ing the inequality, we find that that Pi(1, s–i) ≤ 0 implies k
≥ (V/f) + c – 1. Therefore, Nash equilibrium occurs when
V
f
+ c − 1 ≤ k ≤ V
f
+ c.
In our experiment, V = 15 and f = 5 were constants, and we
set c = 8 on some rounds and c = 4 on others. With c = 8,
equilibrium occurs when 10 ≤ k ≤ 11. With c = 4, equilib-
rium occurs when 6 ≤ k ≤ 7. Nash equilibrium therefore
occurs with 10 or 11 entrants for market capacity 8 and with
6 or 7 entrants for market capacity 4. The complete payoff
functions of market entrants for both market capacities are
shown in Table A1.
Table A1. Payoff functions of entrants for two market
capacities
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